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Options for Local School Districts Reviewing Local 
Governance and Moral Issues Raised by the Equal 
Access Act: The Gay-Straight Student Alliance in 
Utah 
Matthew Hilton, J.D., Ph.D. 1 
On February 20, 1996, an outspoken student speaker 
seeking approval of an extracurricular student club for gay, 
lesbian, bisexual students and their supporting homosexual friends 
informed school board members of the Salt Lake City School 
District that the questions involved were neither moral nor 
religious; they were legal. For other speakers, the legal issues did 
not focus on another unfunded, federal mandate; rather, 
reminiscent of the federal protections afforded civil rights in public 
education in the 1950's and the 1960's, laws like the Equal Access 
Act were needed to ensure equal treatment of student 
perspectives regarding private sexual matters. Like in the 
Lincoln-Douglas Senatorial campaign of 1858 when neither Lincoln 
nor Douglas could find a common moral, legal or constitutional 
ground to debate public policies associated with the expansion of 
slavery in their day, those speaking to the local school board that 
night were unable to find common ground in law, morality, or 
political rationale to define or act on the challenging, practical 
decisions confronting the local school board. 
In light of this modern-day confusion, perhaps a return to 
Abraham Lincoln's counsel to his fellow citizens seeking to limit 
the expansion of slavery on moral and legal grounds would be 
relevant today: "If we could first know where we are, and whither 
we are tending, we could then better judge what to do, and how to 
do it."2 Like the irreconcilable differences evident in the debates 
of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas over the expansion of 
1. Matthew Hilton, of Springville, Utah, is a practicing civil rights attorney and 
educational consultant, holding four degrees from Brigham Young University 
including a master's degree in history, a Juris Doctorate in law, and a Ph.D. in 
education. This article reflects solely his personal views and not necessarily those of 
any client or employer. 
2. Abraham Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 
1858, in LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, 
(Vintage Books: The Library of America)(1992) at 131 (emphasis added). 
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slavery, it seems that the political and legal choices that are made 
when confronted with a request for student sponsored clubs 
focusing on sexual matters may well begin and end with one's 
perception of the nature of man and morality. This article will 
briefly review the background of the Equal Access Act (EAA), the 
history of the challenging, unsolicited problems that were 
presented to an unwilling Salt Lake City School Board, the impact 
of the Equal Access Act on a state's fundamental definition of its 
educational mission, and an option under the Equal Access Act 
that could be chosen by a local school board that would prevent 
recognition of a student extracurricular club focusing on sexual 
matters without having to ban all other non-curricular clubs. 
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Seeking understanding of the complex factual and legal 
background confronting the Salt Lake City school board requires 
an awareness of the background of the federal EAA legislation 
that appeared to mandate the decision-making framework of the 
local board, and the factual background of the controversy 
confronting the local school board. 
A. The Legal Background of EAA 
When Congress adopted the EAA by lopsided majorities in 
both the United States Senate and House, its sponsors were 
confident that it would override at least two circuit court decisions3 
and practices of many local school districts that seemed to prevent 
or discourage student-initiated groups of secondary education 
students from meeting to discuss religious matters outside of 
classes on school grounds. Six years after the adoption of the EAA, 
in Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) 
v. Mergens4 ("Mergens"), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that 
the EAA was adopted precisely for that reason. 
We think it significant, however, that the Act, which was passed 
by wide, bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate, 
reflects at least some consensus on a broad legislative purpose. 
The Committee Reports indicate that the Act was intended to 
address perceived widespread discrimination against religious 
speech in public schools, ... and, as the language of the Act 
3. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 
1042-1048 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1155-1156 (1983); Brandon v. 
Guilderland Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1123 
(1982). 
4. 496 U.S. 226, 239 (1990). 
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indicates, its sponsors contemplated that the Act would do more 
than merely validate the status quo. The Committee Reports also 
show that the Act was enacted in part in response to two federal 
appellate court decisions holding that student religious groups 
could not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, meet on 
school premises during noninstructional time. . . . A broad 
reading of the Act would be consistent with the views of those 
who sought to end discrimination by allowing students to meet 
and discuss religion before and after classes. 5 
3 
Under the EAA, all secondary schools that receive federal funds, 
and, which by practice or formal policy, allow student clubs to be 
organized (that are student-initiated and are not directly related 
to the curriculum)6 must treat all student clubs the same 
"regardless of the religious, political, philosophical, or other 
content of their speech at such meetings."7 
Notwithstanding this significant federal mandate, the 
majority of the Court in Mergens stated: 
[W] e think schools and school districts nevertheless retain a 
significant measure of authority over the type of officially 
recognized activities in which their students participate. See, e.g. 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel 
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). First, schools 
and school districts maintain their traditional latitude to 
determine appropriate subjects of instruction. To the extent that 
a school chooses to structure its offerings and existing student 
groups to avoid the Act's obligations, that result is not prohibited 
by the Act .... Second, the Act expressly does not limit a school's 
authority to prohibit meetings that would "materially and 
substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational 
activities within the school."§ 4071(c)(4); cf. Tinher u. Des Moines 
Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) .... The Act 
also preserves "the authority of the school, its agents or 
employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises, 
to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure 
that attendance of students at meetings is voluntary."§ 4071(£). 8 
The text and legislative history of the Act is ambiguous on several 
key points, reflective of the rushed tactics used to adopt legislation 
in Congress. This ambiguous statutory language and cryptic, 
conflicting history of the EAA, its apparent tacit adoption of 
limited open forums through uninformed practices of local school 
5. Id. 
6. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1995); Id. at 226, 235-243, 246. 
7. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1995). 
8. 496 U.S., at 240-41. 
4 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1996 
districts,9 and the inherent conflicts and tensions raised by 
overlapping legal pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Mergens, were all brought into sharp focus in Utah by several East 
High School students in the Salt Lake City School District who 
requested recognition of a student-sponsored club called a "Gay-
Straight Student Alliance."10 
B. The Factual Background of the East High Controversy 
In late 1995, several East High School students petitioned 
their principal for permission to form a "Gay-Straight Student 
Alliance" (hereinafter "Alliance"). The petition read as follows: 
We, the undersigned students of East High School, feel it 
necessary to form a club for gay, lesbian, and bisexual students, 
and their supporting heterosexual friends. The purpose of the 
club would be to increase awareness about homosexuality in high 
schools, to decrease homophobia, and to help gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual students feel safe and welcome in their school 
environment. We request permission to use a classroom for our 
meetings, and a faculty sponsor to assist during the meetings. 
We do not request the use of announcement time, nor do we 
request the use ofthe hallways for flier announcements. We feel 
doing so would attract unwanted attention. We are extremely 
concerned for the safety and well being of our members. 
We are supported by many students, faculty, and parents, as well 
as several Utah organizations. The undersigned as well as many 
other students have been meeting unofficially off campus for 
nearly a month. The attendance at these meetings is about 
twenty people per meeting. We feel that ou[r] numbers are not 
9. At the Feb. 20, 1996 hearing of the Salt Lake City School District, it appeared 
from comments of board members that perhaps basic decisions of educational 
philosophy regarding student clubs (curricular or non-curricular) had not been 
previously addressed. Allowing educational philosophy and policy to be set by de facto 
practice rather than de jure policy may mean many things. For example, maybe local 
school board counsel had previously failed to bring the existence of the 1984 Equal 
Access Law or Mergens decision to the attention of the then sitting school board 
members. Second, perhaps administrators had not brought any matters involving 
student clubs or organization to the attention oftheir school board because many were 
not publicly endorsed by the school. Third, it is possible that a school board could 
have determined that it was politically easier to let the district's de facto policies 
(established by their practices) evolve over time than to comprehensively address the 
educational, legal and moral ramifications of such decisions. Any of the three could 
contribute to the determination of issues raised in this article by de facto practices 
rather than by addressing the same publicly as a matter of law. 
10. The inquiry from the State Office of Education to the Utah Attorney General 
referred to the requested club as the "Gays, Lesbians, Bisexual Club." Speakers at the 
Feb. 20, 1996 school board meeting and other newspaper accounts since then have 
referred to the club as the "Gay-Straight Student Alliance." 
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significant enough to form a club. 
Our meetings would be a time for discussion of topics deemed 
appropriate by the faculty advisor, and the students in 
attendance. We may also invite guest speakers. In addition, we 
will announce during our meetings the events and activities in 
which we will be participating. 
As an official club, we will plan a community service project. We 
will be volunteering for the Utah AIDS Foundation and the Utah 
Stonewall Center. We feel that by doing a monthly community 
service project, we will help our community, in general, to feel 
more comfortable with our club. 
All students and faculty members are welcome at meetings and 
are invited to participate in the discussion. There will be no 
discrimination against anyone for any reason, be it race, age, or 
sexual orientation. We feel quite confident that our diverse 
school would readily welcome a club that is against 
discrimination. 11 
5 
Salt Lake City School District Superintendent Darlene Robles, in 
accordance with applicable state law/2 requested that State 
Superintendent Scott Bean obtain an opinion from the Utah 
Attorney General regarding basic questions arising from the 
student application as well as the parameters of the EAA. After 
following accepted procedures, and providing relevant background 
information/3 on November 3, 1995 Superintendent Bean asked 
Utah Attorney General Jan Graham to respond to the following 
questions: 
1. If a public school permits its students to form traditional clubs 
such as the Ski Club, Key Club, and other clubs not directly 
relating to the curriculum, must it then permit the formation of 
controversial student clubs such as that which is the subject of 
the current East High School petition? 
If the answer to the proceeding question is "yes," please also 
11. The author received a copy of this statement during the Feb. 20, 1996 school 
board meeting. Thereafter, East High staff in the principal's office confirmed it had 
been submitted by the students to the school administration. 
12. UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 53A-1-303(3) and (4) (1953 as amended). 
13. Superintendent Bean noted that "[t]he principal has received a petition from 
several students for establishment of such a club. The principal has also received a 
number of individual letters from persons in the community urging authorization of 
the club. District officials expressed concerns that none of those who have written to 
date [Nov. 3, 1995] have children in East High School and that there may be an 
attempt by outside interests to manipulate this issue." 
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respond to the following: 
2. May school officials prohibit discussions or activities in 
student clubs which, while lawful for adults, are unlawful or 
otherwise restricted, e.g. restrictions under Sections 53A-13-101, 
76-7-322, and 76-7 -323? 
3. To what extent may schools restrict outside speakers, 
advocates, and visitors, and may those restrictions, if permissible, 
be different for controversial clubs than for traditional clubs? 
4. To what extent may schools restrict student participation in a 
club; e.g. if a club is examining controversial issues, may 
membership or attendance be limited to students whose parents 
have given prior approval for their children's involvement? 
5. May a school treat student clubs differently in matters such as 
announcements over the public address system, or in the student 
newspaper, posting club notices, distributing club flyers, 
references in the school yearbook or other official publications, or 
membership recruitment?14 
On December 22, 1995, the Attorney General's Office responded to 
these questions with effectively one sentence: "We agree with your 
interpretation of the federal statute and the Mergens decision that 
high school clubs must be treated equally regardless of their 
controversial status or lose federal funds."15 
Against this backdrop, on February 20, 1996, Salt Lake City 
School Board members stated that, according to their counsel, 
there were two options the school board could follow in responding 
to the student request to form the Alliance. Without abandoning 
the district's desire "to promote and advance curriculum-related 
student clubs that enrich the education and lives of students,"16 
the board's debate and public hearing was focused on two (and only 
two) choices. Under "Option 1," the board could "allow students 
14. Letter from Scott W. Bean, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, to Jan 
Graham, Utah State Attorney General (Nov. 3, 1995). 
15. Letter from William T. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Education 
Division, to Scott Bean, State Superintendent of Public Instruction (Dec. 22, 1995). 
It is not clear on what legal theory the Attorney General's Office based its conclusion 
that a cut-off of federal funds could be imminent when the EAA specifically provides 
the following: "Notwithstanding the availability of any other remedy under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, nothing in this subchapter shall be 
construed to authorize the United States to deny or withhold Federal financial 
assistance to any school." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(e) (1995). 
16. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, Agenda for Public Hearing, Feb. 20, 
1996. 
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opportunities to form and organize student groups that are not 
related to school curriculum" with certain potential, undefined 
restrictions. Under "Option 2," the board could choose to "not 
allow or permit student groups or organizations not directly 
related to the curriculum to organize or meet on school property."17 
The board insisted that the EAA limited their selection to the 
permissive Option 1 or the restrictive Option 2. 18 The board 
members then voted four to three to ban non-curriculum student 
groups or organizations after the beginning of the 1996-97 school 
year. 
II. CONTINUING TO ENCOURAGE MORALLY BASED CIVIC VIRTUE IN 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Notwithstanding protests by local school board members 
regarding federal interference with local school district authority, 
it appears that allowing local school districts to define and 
emphasize morally based civic virtue in public education could well 
be unaffected by the EAA. In Utah, state legislation appears to 
direct that a morally based public education be provided in at least 
two ways. First, on a public level, various state laws require the 
teaching of various civic virtues from a morally based perspective. 
Second, on a private level, parental autonomy and family privacy 
in religious, sexual and other moral matters are statutorily 
protected. It appears that the EAA does not interfere with the 
first objective, but may, depending on which legal authority is used 
to interpret the EAA, interfere with the second. Understanding 
the application of these state laws to activities and curricula in 
public schools in the State of Utah is important for at least two 
reasons. First, it is important to understand what legal 
constraints define the role and mission of public education in the 
state. Second, it is important to understand which, if any, of these 
state-mandated directives could be understood as conflicting with 
17. Id. Unless the prohibition was restricted to "meet[ing] on school property" 
during school hours, it appears that the "restriction to meet on school property" may, 
if responsible adults or other entities were involved, constitute a violation of the Utah 
statutory law creating an open public forum on schools after hours. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 53A-3-413 and 414 (1953 as amended). 
18. The board not only banned the non-curricular clubs in the fall of 1996, but also 
determined to take action and express their views to federal legislators from Utah and 
other school districts in the State. At least one board member felt that the fear 
expressed by Justice Stevens, in his Mergens dissent, was coming to pass: "If a high 
school administration continues to believe it is sound public policy to exclude 
controversial groups, such as political clubs, the Ku Klux Klan, and perhaps gay rights 
advocacy groups, from its facilities, it must now also close its doors to traditional 
extracurricular activities that are noncontroversial but not directly related to any 
course being offered at the school." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting.) 
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the language or intent of the EAA, and therefore, be pre-empted or 
overridden by the same under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. 19 
A. Teaching Morally Based Civic Virtues in the Public Schools 
Like many states, Utah requires that students be taught 
certain values and virtues in public school.20 Utah law requires 
these virtues to be taught in connection with regular schoolwork 
and presumes teachers will promote such conduct. Apparently, 
this requirement to teach and role model a morally based civic 
virtue is not preempted by any EAA provisions. 
1. Basic State Law Requirements 
Under Utah state law, "[H]onesty, temperance, morality, 
courtesy, obedience to law, ... respect for parents and the home, 
... and other skills, habits, and qualities of character which will 
promote an upright and desirable citizenry and better prepare 
students for a richer, happier life ... [must be] ... taught in 
connection with regular school work."21 A 1978 Attorney General 
Opinion addressing an earlier but similar version of the mandate 
to teach morality and obedience to law in the school interpreted 
the legislation broadly. 
That same opm10n advised former State School 
Superintendent Walter D. Talbot that the statutory reference to 
19. The Supremacy Clause provides the following: "This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
(U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.) "In the absence of explicit statutory language signaling an 
intent to preempt [state law], we infer such intent where ... the state law at issue 
conflicts with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply with both ... or 
because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
congressional objectives." Northwest Cent. Pipeline v. Kansas Corp. Co., 489 U.S. 493, 
509 (1989). 
20. For example, twenty-five states mandate by statute or constitutional 
provision that their public schools teach or promote morality. See ARK. CONST. art. 
14, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-18-501; CAL. CONST. art. IX,§ 1; CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 44806; 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 27-12, 27-15; IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1; IND. CODE ANN.§ 20-
10.1-4-4; IOWA CONST. art. 9, 2nd§ 3; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 158.190; ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 20, § 1221; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, cl. 5, § 2; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 2; 
MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 1; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 126.03; NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-214; N.Y. 
EDUC. LAw§ 801; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. 
VIII,§§ 1, 3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.601; OR. REV. STAT. § 336.067; R.I. CONST. 
art. XII,§ 1; S.C. CODE ANN.§ 59-29-10; S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1; S.D. CODIFIED LAws 
ANN.§ 13-33-6; VT. CONST. ch. II,§ 68; VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-208; W.VA. CONST. art. 
12, § 12; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.01. 
21. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-13-101(4) (1953 as amended). 
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"morality'' could include the teaching of chastity within the context 
of other civic virtues: 
Section 53-14-10 specifically requires the teaching of those 
qualities which will prepare "our youth for a richer, happier life." 
There are manifold problems and difficulties arising from 
unchastity which would have a negative impact with respect to 
the promotion of a richer, happier life for our youth. Certainly 
anyone who has dealt with young people is aware of the problems 
of guilt, unwanted pregnancies, abortion, adoption, and venereal 
disease. 
Because the law mandates the teaching of morality, which 
necessarily includes sexual morality, and mandates the obedience 
to law, including those laws relating to the aforementioned sexual 
offenses together with the laws prohibiting such things as 
lewdness, sodomy, obscenity, and contributing to the delinquency 
of a minor; and mandates teaching which will prepare youth for 
a richer, happier life, it is my opinion that it is clearly appropriate 
that the public schools should teach chastity to their students. 
Certainly nothing should be done or condoned by teachers or 
administrators which would teach, promote, or condone 
immorality or unchastity .... Where Section 53-14-10 [now § 53A-
13-101(4)] requires the teaching of honesty, morality, courtesy 
and obedience to law it is proper and appropriate that the content 
and applicability of various laws be discussed with the students 
with the objective of encouraging the students' obedience to these 
laws. . . . This decision and many others indicate that a code of 
moral conduct is often expressed through elected representatives 
in the enactment of statutes and ordinances. 22 
There is a long-recognized relationship between moral judgments 
and statutory law. Legislatively defined, "criminal punishment 
usually represents the moral condemnation of the community."23 
Legislatures "are constituted to respond to the will and 
consequently the moral values of the people."24 Thus, Utah's 
requirement to teach morality and obedience to law can be 
understood to mean, at a minimum, encouraging adherence to the 
moral judgment expressed by the state's criminal code. 
22. Letter from Asst. Att'y Gen. Thomas Anderson to Superintendent Talbot (Nov. 
14, 1978). 
23. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985), citing United States v. 
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
24. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 253, 175 (1976) (citation omitted). 
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2. Effective Teaching of Morally Based Civic Virtue is Not 
Undermined by Academic Freedom, Student Speech, or Teacher 
Private Conduct 
Local school districts are charged with implementing the 
state mandate to teach morally based civic virtue by providing "the 
setting and opportunities to teach [these values] by example and 
role modeling."25 As applied to private sexual matters of students 
or their teachers, acts of fornication, adultery, and sodomy 
remain criminal acts in Utah.26 The power to regulate student and 
teacher conduct to ensure that the foundation of a school's 
educational mission to teach morality and obedience to law has 
long been recognized in state and federal court decisions. 
a. Regulating Speech and Conduct in the Classroom 
Claims of academic freedom by teachers and freedom of 
speech rights by students do not require the school to undermine 
its fundamental mission ofteaching morality and obedience to law. 
In curricula or other classroom matters, 
[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent 
with its 'basic educational mission.' . . . even though the 
government could not censor similar speech outside the school. 
... [T]he school is entitled to 'disassociate itself from the speech 
in a manner that would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity 
is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public 
school education. 27 
Because the Tenth Circuit has found that a teacher's speech rights 
are similar to those ofstudents,28 and Utah law allows local school 
districts and public schools to participate in defining their own 
educational mission within the framework of state law,29 a school 
district could limit teacher and student speech and conduct by 
choosing not to give its official imprimatur to that which 
significantly and materially undermines the schools' presentation 
of civic virtue and morals within the constraints of existing state 
criminal law and statutory protections of parental autonomy and 
25. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-701-4 A; C (1995). 
26. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 76-7-103, 76-7-104, 76-5-403 (1953 as amended). 
27. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1988) (citations 
omitted.) Denial of student speech inconsistent with a school's "basic educational 
mission" is allowed under precedent interpreting Hazelwood. See Chandler v. 
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992). 
28. See footnote 37, infra. 
29. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 53A-1A-101(8), (12) (1953 as amended). 
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family privacy. 
The general principle that teachers do not have academic 
freedom30 in the traditional sense31 was reaffirmed in two recent 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases. In Roberts u. Madigan, 32 a 
fifth-grade school teacher challenged the school principal's decision 
to remove two "Christian" books from his classroom and to prohibit 
him from reading his personal Bible during class free reading time. 
The school principal was motivated by a desire to avoid an 
Establishment Clause violation as well as by the pedagogical 
concern that the teacher "be actively involved in teaching 
children." Ultimately, the federal appellate court upheld the right 
ofthe local school to disassociate itself from Establishment clause 
violations and prevent teacher speech for that reason as well as 
other motivations "reasonably related to legitimate academic 
concerns."33 
Subsequently, in Miles u. Denver Public Schools,34 a teacher 
vocalized derogatory, personal feelings about a school tennis team 
member's amorous public conduct. The principal disciplined the 
teacher for making the statement. The appellate court upheld the 
lower court's summary judgment in favor of the school district. 
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that a "public forum is not created by 
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by 
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse."35 Apparently, the express provisions of state law 
requiring the teaching of morality and obedience to law in all 
30. Other federal court decisions addressing secondary school academic freedom 
issues include Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) cert. 
denied 115 S.Ct. 2460 (1995), Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. ofEduc., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 
(3rd Cir.1990), Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1307 (7th 
Cir.1980), and Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 397 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974, three judge opinion), affirmed 419 U.S. 1081 (1974). In Utah, under the 
statutory provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101 (1953 as amended) and 
implementing administrative rules, it appears teachers or volunteers retain a right 
to speak ofthe theistic, agnostic or atheistic assumptions of cultural heritage, societal 
values, political theory or moral theory that are relevant to the curricula. 
31. The U. S. Supreme Court found efforts to impose "academic freedom" by 
mandating the teaching of scientific evidence favoring a theory of creationism when 
also teaching about the theory of evolution to be unconstitutional on establishment 
clause grounds. In that setting since "in the state of Louisiana, courses in public 
schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education and teachers are not free, 
absent permission, to teach courses different from what is required ... '[a]cademic 
freedom,' at least as that phrase is commonly understood, is not a relevant concept in 
this context." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 n.6 (1987). 
32. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
33. ld. at 1057. 
34. 944 F.2d 773 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
35. ld. at 776. 
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aspects of school class work36 could prevent a local school from 
creating an open forum that undermined the values and virtues 
outlined in the statute. Indeed, 
[a] school's interests in regulating classroom speech -- such as 
"assur[ing] that participants learn whatever lessons the activity 
is designed to teach" and that students are not "exposed to 
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity" 
(Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 570) -- are implicated 
regardless of whether that speech comes from a teacher or 
student. 37 
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit specifically found that "case law 
does not support Miles' position that a secondary school teacher 
has a constitutional right to academic freedom."38 Prohibiting 
teacher or employee conduct that endorses or encourages "illegal" 
or "immoral" conduct is within the prerogative of the legislature, 
State Office of Education, and local school districts. 
On the other hand, student speech is broadly protected 
under Utah law. A student's expression ofpersonal belief"may not 
be penalized" when participating in school-directed curricula or 
activities, unless "the expression unreasonably interferes with 
order or discipline, threatens the well-being of any person or 
property, or violates a concept of civility or propriety appropriate 
to a school setting."39 Similarly, during non-instructional time, 
student speech rights cannot be denied unless "the conduct 
unreasonably interferes with the ability of school officials to 
maintain order and discipline, unreasonably endangers persons or 
property, or violates concepts of civility and propriety appropriate 
to a school setting."40 Without addressing whether or not the 
discussion topics sought to be included by the Alliance in their 
student organization would violate "concepts of civility and 
propriety appropriate to a school setting,"41 it is clear that the right 
36. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-13-101(4) (1953 as amended). 
37. 944 F.2d at 777 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
38. Id. at 779 (and cases cited therein). 
39. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.3(1) (1953 as amended). 
40. Utah Code Ann.§ 53A-13-101.3(2) (1953 as amended). While the state rule 
addresses the aspects of this statute dealing with the exercise of religious freedoms, 
and specifically limits involvement of school officials, see UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-104 B, 
no provision has been made in administrative rule regarding exercise of free speech 
rights by students. It is assumed that the word "unreasonably" (when modified by the 
apparent requirements of actual, rather than anticipated, disruption and the use of 
the least restrictive means to stop the disruption, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.3(3) 
(1953 as amended), as applied, would conform with the requirements of Tinker v. Des 
Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
41. While not addressed in this article, resolution of this issue may well have a 
direct bearing on fulfilling the implied legislative intent evident when the language 
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of student speech does not go so far as to require official school 
recognition and endorsement of that speech. Neither a generalized 
claim by teachers to academic freedom nor state protected student 
speech appears to be available when either one undermines the 
basic educational mission of the public schools to teach morality 
and obedience to law. 
b. Regulating Teacher Conduct Off Campus That Impacts Effective 
Performance in the Classroom 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized a state's 
interest in inquiring into school employees' private conduct to 
determine the employees' fitness. In 1960, the Court reaffirmed 
that "[t]here can be no doubt ofthe right of a State to investigate 
the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its 
schools, as this Court before now has had occasion to recognize."42 
Indeed, the Court has said: 
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he 
shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which 
they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. That school 
authorities have the right and the duty to screen officials, 
teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the 
integrity of the schools as part of ordered society, cannot be 
doubted.43 
There is "no requirement in the federal constitution that a 
teacher's classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his 
fitness. Fitness for teaching depends on a broad range of factors. 
,44 
While it is understood and recognized that First 
Amendment protections give teachers the right to speak out 
publicly on matters that address educational concerns of public 
import, this right only applies when the statements "are neither 
shown nor can be presumed in any way to have either impeded the 
teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom 
or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools 
was adopted and provide an option for broadly based local district policies that 
address student-to-student sexual harassment, similar to that adopted by the Salt 
Lake City School District shortly after their decision to ban extra-curricular clubs for 
the 1996-97 school year. See "Student to Student Sexual Harassment Policy" adopted 
on March 5, 1996. 
42. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960). 
43. Adler v. Bd. ofEduc., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952). 
44. Beilan v. Bd. ofEduc., 357 U.S. 399, 406 (1958). 
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generally."45 
While not specifically addressed in these opinions, more 
recent cases on both federal and state levels have interpreted 
requirements to refrain from immoral conduct as not infringing on 
private First Amendment expressive activity. These prohibitions 
were upheld as long as there was (1) a nexus between private 
conduct deemed to be immoral, and (2) either one's teaching 
performance or the administration of the school. 
A leading case in this area is National Gay Task Force u. 
Board of Education of City of Oklahoma. 46 The State of Oklahoma 
forbade "public homosexual conduct," which was defined as 
"advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting private 
homosexual activity [public, non-private commission of sodomy] in 
a manner than creates a substantial risk that such conduct will 
come to the attention of school children or school employees," and 
provided for suspension, refusal of employment and other 
sanctions for public teachers that engaged in such prohibited 
conduct. When this law was subjected to a facial challenge, 
homosexuality was not afforded protection as a suspect class47 
(whether status-based or conduct-based), but private advocacy by 
school employees in favor of such conduct "aimed at legal and 
social change," was found to be protected speech. 
The First Amendment does not permit someone to be punished 
for advocating [in a private capacity] illegal conduct at some 
indefinite future time .... We recognize that a state has interests 
in regulating the speech of teachers that differ from its interests 
in regulating the speech of the general citizenry .... But a state's 
interests outweigh a teacher's interests only when the expression 
results in a material or substantial interference or disruption in 
the normal activities of the school. This Court has held that a 
teacher's First Amendment rights may be restricted only if "the 
employer shows that some restriction is necessary to prevent the 
disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance 
by the employee. 48 
In its ruling, the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the earlier 
45. Pickeringv. Bd. ofEduc. ofTownship High Sch. Dist. No. 205,391 U.S. 563, 
572-73 (1968). 
46. 729 F.2d 1270 (lOth Cir. 1984), affd by an equally divided court 470 U.S. 903 
(1985). 
47. See also Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (lOth Cir. 1984), cited 
in Jantz v. Munci, 976 F.2d 623, 630 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1992). 
48. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d. at 1274 (citations omitted). For other 
authority upholding legislative access that had no evidentiary impact on classroom 
performance, see Barnett v. State of Wisconsin Ethics Bd., 817 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Wis. 
1993). 
1] THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT 15 
efforts of the district court to "save" the statute by reading into it 
an unstated legislative requirement that any challenged, private 
conduct of a teacher must have a demonstrable nexus to classroom 
peformance. 
Efforts to restrict private conduct of teachers--whether 
considered "immoral" or "illegal" have been challenged in the state 
and federal courts for some time. However, many courts have 
found that restrictions may occur when "unfitness to teach" or 
disruption of the governance of schools by reason of the conduct is 
shown. An early case articulating this standard is Gaylord u. 
Tacoma School District. No. 10,49 which accepted evidence that 
disclosure of homosexual tendencies and implicit practice could 
"impair or reasonably be said to impair his ability to perform the 
duties of an occupation in which the homosexual engages" and also 
impaired "the effectiveness of the institution which employed 
him."50 
As to demonstrating "unfitness to teach," several California 
cases followed precedent which interpreted seven criteria used to 
determine if"immoral" conduct implicates one's fitness to teach, or 
impacts on one's teaching performance: 
Since the term "immoral conduct" is vague and broad, whether 
such conduct demonstrates unfitness to teach is measured 
against seven criteria: (1) the likelihood that the conduct may 
have adversely affected students or fellow teachers, (2) the degree 
of such adversity anticipated, (3) the proximity or remoteness of 
time of such conduct, ( 4) the type of teaching certificate held by 
the party involved, (5) the extenuating or aggravating 
circumstances, if any surrounding the conduct, (6) the likelihood 
ofthe recurrence of the questioned conduct, and (7) the extent to 
which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse impact or chilling 
effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or 
other teachers.51 
Under these criteria, while the issue for resolution regarding 
"immorality" is ultimately one of fact and not law, the complex 
legal standard that is used encourages either judicial action or 
local school board inaction in this area. 
Other jurisdictions have not imposed such specific 
guidelines that easily allow a judge in practice to impose his or her 
49. 559 P.2d 134 (Wash. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 879 (1977). 
50. Id. at 134. 
51. This standard has been followed in Governing Bd. of ABC Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Haar, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 751 (Cal. App. 2d 1994), and cases cited therein; see also 
Thompson v. Southwest Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp. 1171, 1182 (D.C.Mo. 1980); Coupeville 
Sch. Dist. No. 204 v. Vivian, 677 P.2d 192, 196-197 (Wash. App. 1984). 
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personal perspectives regarding the structure, function, and 
outcome of public education52 on locally elected school boards. For 
example, in Pennsylvania, immorality has been interpreted as 
being "a course of conduct that offends the morals of the 
community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals the 
teacher is supposed to foster and elevate."53 Elsewhere, an 
alternate form of analysis was used to determine when conduct is 
disruptive enough to warrant immediate dismissal without 
warning. 54 When a teacher wrote overtly sexual letters to two 
students and was suspended for engaging in immoral conduct, an 
appellate court followed earlier precedent and held that the 
teacher's actions were irremediable, and justified disciplinary 
action without written warning. 
A warning, even if effective in stopping the plaintiffs conduct 
would not be effective in correcting ... damage to the students or 
the damage to the reputation of the faculty, school district and 
[teacher] himself .... The [teacher's] conduct has no legitimate 
basis in social policy or society. No purpose would be served by 
giving the [teacher] a written warning. We conclude, therefore, 
that the [teacher's] conduct is irremediable. 55 
Prohibited "immoral conduct" is not limited to sexual matters. It 
may include theft of property,56 possession of marijuana and 
cocaine, 57 undisclosed sexual activity with a student before hiring 
in a subsequent school district,58 and lying or making false 
statements to the school district regarding absences from work.59 
Thus, state and local school board efforts to ensure that a teacher's 
private conduct does not prevent effective performance in teaching 
morally based civic virtue or otherwise interfere with the 
administration of the public schools, are supported by significant 
legal precedent upholding such actions. 
52. I am indebted to Professor Neil Flinders of the BYU College of Education for 
promoting in his work an increased awareness of these three concepts as analytical 
tools to evaluate practical challenges in education that are evident in both 
jurisprudential theory and educational philosophy. 
53. Horton v. Vocational Technical Sch., 630 A.2d 481 (Pa. Commw. 1993). 
54. Sparta Sch. Dist. 140 v. Illinois State Bd. ofEduc., 577 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. 
5th. 1991). 
55. Id. at 906 (citations omitted). 
56. Cochran v. Bd. ofEduc. ofMexico Sch. Dist. N. 59, 815 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. App. 
1991). 
57. Dubuclet v. Home Ins. Co., 660 So.2d 67 (La. App. 4th 1995). 
58. Toney v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., Bd. ofEduc., 881 P.2d 1112 
(Alaska 1994). 
59. Riverview Sch. Dist. v. Riverview Educ. Ass'n, PSEA-NEA, 639 A.2d 974 (Pa. 
Commw. 1994). 
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3. Neither the EAA nor Supreme Court Precedent Preempts the 
Goal of Morally Based Civic Virtue in Public Education 
There appears to be no serious risk of federal preemption 
under the Supremacy Clause on either statutory or judicial 
grounds when a state or local government determines to teach 
morally based civic virtue in public education. The text of the EAA 
demonstrates that the Act is only applicable to non-curricular 
student organizations. There are no textual requirements that 
mandate application of any standards to course work or curricular 
clubs. Indeed, the Mergens opinion specifically recognized that the 
right to direct curriculum and extracurricular activities still 
resided with school districts. 
Furthermore, the restrictions on the official speech of 
employees or volunteers do not infringe on the statutory provisions 
of the EAA. A club afforded "equal access" and a "fair opportunity" 
is not guaranteed a faculty adviser; in fact, the federal law allows 
faculty to be present only in a "non-participatory capacity."60 
Presently, Utah law requires teachers to teach and role model 
morality and obedience to law. If the activities of a group such as 
the Alliance were reasonably understood as encouraging criminal 
conduct, employees or volunteers could be directed to refrain from 
promoting the same in their official capacities.61 Allowing faculty 
to serve only as monitors of student conduct rather than active 
advisers,62 does not interfere with the intent or purposes of the 
EAA.63 
While expressed in different ways, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has also repeatedly presumed that American public education's 
task is to instill moral and civic values in students. 
Notwithstanding the Court's inconsistent use of evidentiary 
assumptions and legal standards in education-related cases,64 as 
shown hereafter, the recognition and acceptance of the role of 
60. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3) (1995). 
61. In light oflegislative directives regarding teaching morality and obedience to 
law and an administrative rule of the State Office of Education to role model the 
same, such a mandate could be construed as "reasonably related to legitimate 
academic concerns" under Hazelwood. 
62. Alliance's request presumed that the faculty adviser would be actively 
involved in setting the agenda for the group's discussions. 
63. The EAA specifically determined that "[t]he assignment of a teacher, 
administrator or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not 
constitute sponsorship of that meeting." 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2) (1995). See also, Seese 
v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 811 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
64. See Matthew Hilton, Recognizing Constitutional Freedoms in Public Schools: 
Reasserting State and Local Educational Policy and Practice through Non-Judicial 
Law, 1994 B.Y.U. Educ. and L. J. 1, 3-5. 
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public schools, as an institution designed to promote and build civic 
virtue, as defined by local school boards has remained constant in 
significant Court opinions discussing the role of public education.65 
For example, early Court opinions assumed that student 
internalization of morality was a basic objective of public educa-
tion. Early in U.S. history, the Supreme Court recognized that: 
[s]chools and education were regarded by the congress of the 
Confederation as the most natural and obvious appliances for the 
promotion of religion and morality. In the ordinance of 1787, 
passed for the government of the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, 
it is declared, article 3, 'Religion, morality and knowledge being 
necessary to good government ... the means of education shall 
forever be encouraged.'66 
In 1898, the Court reaffirmed an 1881 holding that governments 
could fund education by public taxation because moral training 
provided by the education contributed to social stability: 
Every man in a county, a town, a city or a state is deeply 
interested in the education of the children of the community, 
65. In cases such as Bd. ofEduc., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. 
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) where five opinions analyzed on differing grounds the 
plurality's finding of a "new" liberty of access to certain books in a high school library, 
eight of the nine justices disclaimed any intent to undermine local control over content 
of the curriculum. The plurality opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens 
stated that "local school boards must be permitted to 'establish and apply their 
curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values' and that 'there is a 
legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and 
traditional values be they social, moral or political."' Id. at 864. Justice Blackman 
recognized that "[b]ecause of the essential socializing function of schools, local 
education officials may attempt 'to promote civic virtue."' ld. at 876. While Justice 
White did not address the issue, in dissenting opinions, Justices Burger, Powell, 
Rehnquist and O'Connor determined that "school authorities must have broad 
discretion" to fulfill the obligation to promote "respect for authority, and traditional 
values be they social, moral, or political." ld. at 889. Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justice Burger and Powell, opined that "[w]hen it acts as an educator, at least at the 
elementary and secondary school level, the government is engaged inculcating social 
values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people. Obviously, there are 
numerous decisions to be made as to what courses should be taught, what books 
should be purchased, or what teachers should be employed. In every one of these 
areas the members of a local school board will act on the basis of their own personal 
or moral values, will attempt to mirror those of the community, or will abdicate the 
making of such decisions to so-called 'experts.' In this connection, I find myself 
entirely in agreement with the observation of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1230, 1305 (1980), that 
it is 'permissible and appropriate for local boards to make educational decisions based 
upon their personal, social, political, or moral views .... In short, actions by 
government as educator do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions 
by government as sovereign." Id. at 909-910. 
66. The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 65 (1890). 
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because his peace and quiet, his happiness and prosperity, are 
largely dependent upon the intelligence and moral training which 
it is the object of public schools to supply to the children of his 
neighbors and associates, if he has none himself.67 
19 
Court opinions in the post-World War I private education 
cases, Meyer v. Nebraska68 (hereinafter "Meyer") and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters69 continued to operate on the assumption that 
government had an interest in seeing that basic morality and civic 
virtue was promoted in both public and private schools. Even 
though the law prohibiting instruction in the living European 
languages before the eighth grade was enacted as an effort "to 
promote civic development,"70 it was declared unconstitutional 
because it was an infringement on the natural rights of parents to 
employ tutors and select subject matter of their own choosing. 
Nonetheless, 
[t]hat the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to 
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally, and 
morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental 
rights which must be respected .... [Nonetheless,] [t]he power of 
the state to compel attendance at some school and to make 
reasonable regulations for all schools ... is not questioned.71 
Indeed, 
[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the state 
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and 
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all 
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be 
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain 
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and 
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public 
welfare. 72 
Recognition of the importance of morality and education IS 
evidenced in more modern opinions as well. 
In 1979, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to New 
York's refusal to allow aliens to teach in the public school system: 
67. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 279 (1898), citing Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 
78, 82 (1881). 
68. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
69. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
70. 262 U.S., at 401. 
71. Id. at 401-402. 
72. 268 U.S., at 534. 
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The curricular requirements of New York's public school system 
reflect some of the ways a public school system promotes the 
development of the understanding that is prerequisite to 
intelligent participation in the democratic process. The schools 
are required to provide instruction "to promote a spirit of 
patriotic and civic service and 'obligation and to foster in the 
children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are 
essential in preparing to meet the obligations of citizenship in 
peace or in war ... .' Flag and other patriotic exercises also are 
prescribed, as loyalty is a characteristic of citizenship essential to 
the preservation of a country. In addition, required courses 
include classes in civics, United States and New York history, and 
principles of American government. 
Although private schools are bound by most of these 
requirements, the State has a stronger interest in ensuring that 
the schools it most directly controls, and for which it bears the 
cost, are as effective as possible in teaching these courses."73 
The Court followed earlier precedent indicating that "public school 
teachers may be regarded as performing a task 'that goes to the 
heart of representative government."'74 It stated: 
[t]he importance of public schools in the preparation of 
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation 
of the values on which our society rests, [has been] long 
recognized by our decisions ... 
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in 
developing students' attitudes toward government and 
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. . . . In shaping 
the students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by 
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material 
is communicated to students. They are responsible for presenting 
and explaining the subject matter in a way that is both compre-
hensible and inspiring. No amount of standardization of teaching 
materials or lesson plans can eliminate the personal qualities a 
teacher brings to bear in achieving these goals. Further, a 
teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle 
but important influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, 
through both the presentation of course materials and the 
example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the 
attitudes of students towards government, the political process, 
73. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78 n.8 (1979) (citations omitted). 
74. Id. at 75-76. 
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and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to 
the continued health of a democracy ... 
More importantly, a State properly may regard all teachers as 
having an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding 
in their classes, regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a 
State also may take account of a teacher's function as an example 
for students, which exists independently of particular classroom 
subjects. 75 
21 
In 1982, in the case of Plyler v. Doe,76 the Court took 
occasion to comment on the importance of education in American 
society. This discussion arose while examining the duty Texas had 
to provide public education for children of illegal aliens. Nine 
years earlier, Texas persuaded the Court that education was a 
right which was not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 77 The 
issue arose as to whether or not the federal government could 
impose equal protection standards on Texas' refusal to educate 
children of illegal aliens. In determining that the state had to 
accord certain rights to the children of illegal aliens, the Court 
addressed significant precedent supporting a state's right to 
provide a morally based education: 
The "American people have always regarded education and [the] 
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance, 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400,43 S.Ct. 625, 627,67 L.Ed. 
1042 (1923). We have recognized "the public schools as a most 
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 
of government," Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 230, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1575, 10 L.Ed.2d 884 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring), and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the 
values upon which our society rests." Ambach v. Norwich, 441 
U.S. 68, 76, 99 S.Ct. 1589, 1594, 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979). 78 
More recent opinions have clarified that public education may be 
constitutionally permitted. 
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting 
that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to 
sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the "work of 
the schools." . . . The process of educating our youth for 
citizenship in public schools is not confined to the books, the 
75. ld. at 76-80. 
76. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
77. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
78. 457 U.S., at 221. 
22 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1996 
curriculum, and the civics class; school must teach by example the 
shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or 
otherwise, teachers -- and indeed the older students --
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political 
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class. 
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models .... The First 
Amendment does not prevent the school officials from 
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as 
respondent's would undermine the school's basic educational 
mission.79 
Following similar reasoning, it stated: 
[a] school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor 
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate 
drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise 
inconsistent with "the shared values of a civilized social order". 
. . or to associate the school with any position other than 
neutrality on matters of political controversy. Otherwise, the 
schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as 
"a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, 
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment." ... [W]e hold that 
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.80 
All of the above suggest that the specific legislative directive to 
teach morally based civic virtue and obedience to law may continue 
to be directed under state law and identified as an integral part of 
the mission of public education, without fear of preemption by the 
EAA or the Supreme Court precedent outlined above.81 
B. Protecting Parental Autonomy and Family Privacy in Public 
Education 
Utah adopted specific legislative protections regarding 
parental autonomy (as to matters of conscience) and family privacy 
in public education.82 Protecting choices based on conscience (or 
79. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-685 (1986). 
80. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-273 (1988). 
81. If carefully designed, conscientiously administered , and consistently applied, 
these decisions need not violate the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause. See 
Matthew Hilton, supra, footnote 64 at 9-11. 
82. By statute, Utah law prohibits funding of instruction or encouragement of the 
use of contraceptives. Like the analysis which follows regarding state law upholding 
parental autonomy and family privacy, depending on the judicial authority relied 
upon, this law may be preempted when applied to a non-curricular student club under 
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adherence to "a superior duty which is more than personal 
preference"83) or family privacy regarding sexual matters, religious 
beliefs, and family relationships, allows parents to ensure that 
those who "work at creating one type of moral environment at 
home" are not required to have their children participate in school 
curricula or activities "that teaches a different set of values."84 
Nonetheless, depending on which EAA lower court precedent one 
chooses, applying these protections of conscience and family to 
non-curricular related student clubs may be preempted by the 
EAA. 
1. Nature of Utah Law 
In 1993, the Utah State Legislature unanimously passed 
legislation giving broad freedom of conscience prerogatives to 
parents and secondary students. The law provides that when a 
parent or legal guardian "determines that the student's 
participation in a portion of the curriculum or in an activity would 
require the student to affirm or deny a religious belief or right of 
conscience, or engage or refrain from engaging in a practice 
forbidden or required in the exercise of a religious right or right of 
conscience," the parent may request a waiver of the requirement 
to participate or suggest a reasonable alternative. 85 State law 
requires the claimed infringement "must rise to a level of belief 
that the requested conduct violates a superior duty which is more 
than personal preference."86 These rules state that: 
the EAA The Attorney General Opinion of Dec. 22, 1995 failed to address the specific 
request of State Superintendent Bean as to whether or not recognition of the Alliance 
under the EAA was forbidden by the statutory prohibitions regarding provision or 
encouragement of contraceptive services. "Contraceptive services" means "any 
material, program, plan, or undertaking that is used for instruction on the use of birth 
control devices and substances, encourages individuals to use birth control methods, 
or provides birth control devices." UTAH CoDE. ANN. § 76-7 -321(2) (1953 as amended). 
The definition of "funds" that are prohibited include "money, supply, material, 
building, or project provided by this state or its political subdivision." UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 76-7-322 and 323 (1953 as amended). To the degree that the Alliance 
activities were to offer instruction regarding, or encouraging the use of birth control 
devices, such as condoms, it could be argued that such speech was contrary to state 
law prohibiting access to a "building'' for such purposes. It is assumed that in general 
such provisions would survive a facial challenge under the latitude afforded state and 
local governments under Supreme Court opinions in Fraser, supra, and Hazelwood, 
supra. 
83. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5B (1995). 
84. William Kirkpatrick, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T TELL RIGHT FROM WRONG 252 
(Touchstone ed. 1993). 
85. UTAH CODE. ANN.§ 53A-13-101.2(1) (1953 as amended). The law was written 
so that either a parent's or student's request would trigger the ability to remove a 
student on grounds on conscience. 
86. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5 B (1995). 
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[p]ermitting the submission of requests for participation waivers, 
and the provision of reasonable alternatives, is intended to 
facilitate appropriate protection and accommodation of a 
requesting party's asserted right of conscience or exercise of 
religious freedom, and shall not be considered an attempt by a 
school official to endorse, promote, or disparage a particular 
religious or non-religious viewpoint. 87 
To the degree that "an activity" includes student participation in 
a curricular or non-curricular club, or the "counseling" that takes 
place in such a location,88 under existing state law, parents can 
request that their child not participate in the club's activities. 
In 1994, the Utah State Legislature adopted the Utah 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.89 Under this law, 
unanimously reaffirmed as amended in 1995, districts must have 
"policies governing the protection of family and student privacy" to 
"protect the privacy of students, their parents, and their families, 
and support parental involvement in the education of their 
children."90 A two-week, advance written notification is required, 
(waiveable by the parent)91 before a student may be involved in any 
part of the "curriculum" or "other school activities" whose: 
purpose or evident intended effect is to cause the student to 
reveal information, whether the information is personally 
identifiable or not, concerning the student's or any family 
member's ... sexual behavior, orientation or attitudes; illegal, 
anti-social, self-incriminating, or demeaning behavior; critical 
appraisals of individual with whom the student or family member 
has close family relationships; religious affiliations or beliefs92 
without having written permission from the parent.93 Assuming 
that an officially recognized student club (curricular or non-
curricular) would be considered "other school activities," it appears 
from the statute that students need written parental permission, 
after disclosure, to be involved in school clubs. 
87. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5 H (1995). 
88. Counseling of students is defined by administrative rule as constituting 
"instructional time." UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105 G (1995). 
89. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-13-301, 302 (1953 as amended). 
90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-301 (1953 as amended). 
91. Utah Code Ann. § 53A-13-302(4) (1953 as amended). 
92. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-13-302(1),(2),(3) (1953 as amended). 
93. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-13-302(1),(2),(3) (1953 as amended). 
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2. Possible Preemption Under EAA 
The EAA text and interpretive judicial precedent allow at 
least two different ways of analyzing a preemption claim involving 
the application of state laws pertaining to parental autonomy and 
family privacy to student speech and involvement in non-curricular 
clubs under the EAA. Possible conflicts could arise under both 
laws that protect parental autonomy in matters of conscience and 
those involving family privacy. While some could argue that 
student speech is protected under the state's creation of a limited 
public forum regarding student belief,94 protection against 
inappropriate disclosure ofbeliefs, attitudes and actions of parents 
who are either unaware or unable to respond are the very 
prerogatives of local school districts which were recognized in 
Hazelwood. 95 Nonetheless, such law specifically regulates student 
speech in non-curricular clubs that parts of the EAA seemed to 
protect. Under state law allowing parents to remove their children 
from a school "activity" that is offensive to the conscience of the 
parent, an argument can be made that were this parental 
prerogative96 to be exercised, it could, in fact, restrict the ability of 
"any student" to create his own non-curriculum club within the 
limited student forum available to them. 
The EAA interprets "fair opportunity criteria" to require 
that "the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere 
with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the 
school."97 Furthermore, nothing in the EAA was intended to "limit 
the authority of the school ... to protect the well-being of students 
and faculty."98 State laws that seek to comprehensively define 
public education as a public entity seeking to improve the well 
being of students within a context of moral standards and parental 
involvement,99 could be significantly and materially undermined if 
94. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.3 (1953 as amended). This supposition, 
however, is undermined by the legislative history of the Act which specifically 
incorporated reference to the Fraser opinion when defining the nature of"civility and 
decorum" that should exist in student speech. 
95. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The application of Hazelwood to the EAA is problematic 
because the facts of Hazelwood dealt with classroom-related activities associated with 
the school while the EAA presumed that the student-initiated clubs and organizations 
could be disassociated from the school. 
96. Without the exercise of parental prerogative, the school would not be 
involved; it is presumed that the "voluntary" meeting would ensure no student would 
attend who would have wanted to assert his or her own, independent right of 
conscience against participating under the EAA. 
97. 20 U.S. C. § 4071(c)(4) (1995). 
98. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(D (1995). 
99. While not the subject of review here, academic literature has documented how 
26 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1996 
required to give way on fundamental issues of parental exercise of 
conscience, privacy and autonomy because a non-curricular student 
group was allowed on campus. 
Equality in application of preexisting laws was determined 
to be sufficient to justify what, in practice, could result from an 
intrusion of student governance of a student non-curricular club. 
In Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3, 100 a religious 
club objected to standardized rules applied to non-student club 
officer elections because a non-Christian student could seek to 
become an officer of its Bible club. A federal district court upheld 
the requirement, stating, 
[a]s there is no basis in the record for plaintiffs' suggestion that 
the School District will not afford the [B]ible club the same 
privileges afforded other noncurriculum-related clubs and allow 
it to meet on the same terms and conditions as those other clubs, 
the School District appears to have satisfied its obligation under 
the Act of permitting religious speech and religious activities on 
a nondiscriminatory basis. 101 
To the degree the one-sentence legal opmwn from the Utah 
Attorney General was seeking to follow this line of reasoning, state 
laws involving parental autonomy and family privacy that are 
equally applied to student involvement in all clubs, regardless of 
the content of the student speech, are valid, and are binding on 
Utah schools102 and could, under the theory of the Hsu case, be 
upheld as being in conformance with the statutory requirements 
of EAA. If so, there would be no preemption concern. 
Nevertheless, a contrary result regarding the role of the 
EAA and preemption of fundamental state law addressing public 
education could be reached if the thinking of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403 103 
parental involvement in their children's education is a (if not "the") dominant factor 
in the child's educational achievement. Thus, whether acting on grounds respecting 
parental authority for moral or political reasons, a school could well conclude that a 
students' academic "well being" would be well served by allowing or encouraging such 
parental involvement. 
100. 876 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
101. ld. at 456. 
102. This is true for two reasons. First, the opinion of the Attorney General is 
binding on all Utah schools regarding interpretation oflaw. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 
53A-1-303(3) and (4) (1953 as amended). Second, local districts are mandated and 
empowered to implement the same by local policy. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-
101.3 (1953 as amended) and UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-9A(1) (1995) for law regarding 
parental autonomy and conscience; See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 53A-13-301, 302 (1953 as 
amended) regarding privacy laws which are to be implemented on a district level. 
103. 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 72-73 (1993). 
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were applied in Utah. On remand/04 a lower district court ruled 
that the EAA need not be applied because allowing student 
religious meetings violated the Washington State Constitution and 
the EAA did not force the local district to "sanction meetings that 
are otherwise unlawful; ... or to abridge the constitutional rights 
of any person."105 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that 
Congress had provided "religious student groups" a federal right 
and, following the lead in Mergens, "the entire Act must be read to 
effectuate a broad Congressional purpose."106 Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Congress intended to preempt all state laws 
which discriminated against clubs authorized by the EAA due to 
the student groups' speech content: 
The Court's finding of a broad legislative purpose suggests that 
Congress intended to preempt state law: "Congress clearly sought 
to prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis of the content 
of a student group's speech, and that obligation is the price a 
federally funded school must pay if it opens its facilities to 
noncurriculum related student groups." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 241, 
110 S.Ct. at 2367. The Act permits schools to avoid its 
obligations, but only at a price. They must either reject federal 
funding or close the school's limited open forum. See id. If the 
EAA did not preempt state law, then states could freely opt out 
of its requirements. Congress did not intend to permit the states 
to thwart its objectives by outlawing speech based on its religious 
content, and thereby discriminate on that basis. 107 
Protection of the content of student "religious speech" could 
logically be construed to include all speech because the act 
protected not only religious speech but also speech of a "political, 
philosophical, or other content."108 All "other content" could be 
understood to include speech that violated a parent's conscience or 
invaded family privacy. Thus, if the EAA provisions protecting 
student speech in non-curricular clubs were read broadly, state 
laws which provide protection for parental autonomy in matters of 
conscience and family privacy could be preempted by the EAA. 
This result, however, would depend on which legal doctrines were 
used to analyze the text and application of the EAA.109 
104. A previous round of litigation, which was eventually vacated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court is reported in Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. 
Wash. 1987), affd, 865 F.2d 1121, modified, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated and 
remanded in light o{Mergens, 496 U.S. 914 (1990). 
105. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531, 537 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
106. 987 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 72-73 (1993). 
107. !d. at 646. 
108. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1995). 
109. Other federal laws could also be brought into the equation in an effort to 
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Thus, while it is clear that Utah's legislative mandate to 
teach morally based civic virtue in the public schools would remain 
intact under the EAA, other applicable laws dealing with parental 
autonomy regarding matters of conscience and family privacy may 
or may not be preempted by the EAA. 110 
Ill. CONTINUING TO PROTECT THE WELL-BEING OF STUDENTS 
UNDER THE EAA 
Based on the foregoing legal analysis, it could be presumed 
that laws governing Utah's public schools presuppose that the 
teaching of morally based civic virtue and encouraging parental 
involvement in their children's education will in the short and long-
run promote and protect the well-being of students. In Mergens, 
the Court specifically recognized that the text of the EAA and 
earlier precedent specifically protects efforts of school districts to 
protect the well-being of their students. 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the 
authority of the school, its agents, or its employees, to maintain 
order and discipline on the school premises, to protect the well-
being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of 
students at meetings is voluntary. 111 
Precedent interpreting Tinker has allowed local school districts to 
protect high school students from student-to-student emotional 
and psychological harm that can result from exposure to detailed 
matters of sexuality.112 (If such a prohibition is allowed for high 
harmonize federal intent regarding parental participation in their children's 
education. An example of a federal law adopted after the EAA and Mergens decision 
that could have a direct impact on a pre-emption analysis would be the Restoration 
of Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000bb (1995), known as "RRFA". Another issue 
that could be raised and is not addressed in this article is if extracurricular school 
activities are considered to be "educational activities" under the EAA, would an 
attempt to have the EAA pre-empt state laws protecting parental conscience, 
autonomy and family privacy as far as it related to student clubs "materially and 
substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the 
school"? See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (1995). 
110. It is interesting to note that like the EAA, the Utah law regarding freedom 
of conscience affords students protection in their own right. Public schools also allow 
secondary students a right to seek waiver of participation based on grounds of 
conscience independent of their parents. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.2(1) (1953 as 
amended). However, in the event of a conflict between an assertion of conscience by 
a parent and a minor secondary student who wanted to participate in an activity or 
part of the curriculum, the parent's assertion and request for waiver (over student 
desire to participate) would prevail. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5C (1995). 
111. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240-241; cf Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 
u.s. 503, 509 (1969). 
112. This precedent remains relevant in interpreting Supreme Court analysis for 
at least three reasons. First, the contemporaneous Supreme Court denied the writ of 
1] THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT 29 
school students, a fortiori, it should be allowed for seventh and 
eighth graders, all considered secondary students under Utah law 
and the EAA.) 
In 1977, a federal appellate court was confronted with a 
challenge to a school district's prohibition on student distribution 
of an explicit, detailed survey regarding both homosexual and 
heterosexual matters. 113 The trial judge had approved the 
district's ban on distribution to ninth and tenth grade students, 
but had ordered the district to allow it to be distributed to eleventh 
and twelfth grade students. Overruling the district court's decision 
the federal appellate court upheld the right of the school district to 
prohibit distribution of the survey to all students because 
of the probability that it would result in psychological harm to 
some students. . . . Although psychological diagnoses of the type 
involved here are by their nature difficult of precision, ... we do 
not think defendants' inability to predict with certainty that a 
certain number of students in all grades would be harmed should 
mean that defendants are without power to protect students 
against a foreseen harm. We believe that the school authorities 
are sufficiently experienced in these matters, which have been 
entrusted to them by the community; a federal court ought not 
impose its own views in such matters where there is a rational 
basis for the decisions and actions of school authorities. 114 
The rationale supporting the prohibition allowed the local school 
district to determine which testimony among many conflicting 
"experts" was most applicable for their district and that the 
anticipated harm need not impact all students or even an 
"average" student. 
While lawyers are generally not well versed in social science 
literature,115 even a brief review shows that those who are studying 
certiorari that was filed in the case. Second, in the Court's opinion in Hazelwood it 
referred to the opinion as an example of substantial deference provided to school 
authorities. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Third, it is realistic to presume that the 
Court was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents and 
expected its decision in Mergens (which also referred to Hazelwood) to be interpreted 
accordingly. Cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979). 
113. A copy of the survey is included with the district court opinion reported in 
Trachtman v. Anker, 426 F. Supp. 198, 205-207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Not only was the 
school district required to allow distribution of the survey, but in the words of the 
appellate court reviewing the decision, the lower court "ordered [the district] to take 
steps to oversee the distribution of the questionnaire and provide counseling for those 
students who were disturbed by it; in effect, defendants were told to expend time and 
money to provide 'safeguards' for a survey they insisted could not be made safe." 
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 520 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1977). 
114. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.3d at 519. 
115. I am indebted to Dr. A. Dean Byrd and David Robertson for their significant 
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the nature and origins of homosexuality have not definitively 
determined whether homosexuality is a natural variation in 
human behavior or a dysfunction or a combination of both. 116 
Notwithstanding this lack of consensus (other than apparent 
agreement that the issue is very complex) other academic studies 
begin by assuming that homosexuality is either a normal variation 
or a dysfunction. 117 
Despite this fundamental difference in foundational 
assumptions, there is some agreement regarding youth who 
experience gender confusion. Compared to teenagers with an 
unquestioned heterosexual orientation, those teenagers who are 
confronted with challenges feel a greater isolation from peers, 
parents, and community, and exhibit a much higher incidence of 
self-defeating behaviors, such as psychological dysfunction, 
substance abuse, suicide, sexually transmitted diseases and 
HIV. 118 Others have indicated that most school teachers and 
assistance in researching relevant professional literature and aiding my presentation 
of it here. 
116. See, for example, William Byne, The Biological Evidence Challenged, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 50 (May 1994), Richard C. Friedman and Jennifer Downey, 
Neurobiology and Sexual Orientation: Current Relationships, 5 JOURNAL OF 
NEUROPSYCHIATRY 131, 149 (1993); William Wyne and Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual 
Orientation: The Biologic Theories Reappraised, 50 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL 
PSYCHIATRY 228, 236-37 (1993); Eli Colman, Louis Fooren, Michael Ross, Theories of 
Gender Transpositions: A Critique and Suggestions for Further Research, 26 THE 
JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH 525 (1989); John Money, Sin. Sickness. or Status? 
Homosexual Gender Identity and Psychoneuroendocrinology, 1988 ANNUAL PROGRESS 
IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 41 (1988). Even though in 1973 the 
American Psychological Association declassified homosexuality as a mental illness, 
professional disagreements over the validity of such action remain. See Toward a 
Further Understanding of Homosexuality, COLLECTED PAPERS FROM THE NATIONAL 
AsSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
(1995); Marshall B. Clinard and Robert F. Meier, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 
(1992) at 320, and sources cited therein. 
117. For studies assuming homosexuality is a natural variation, see, for example, 
Virginia Uribe and Karen M. Harbeck, Addressing the Needs of Lesbian. Gay. and 
Bisexual Youth: The Origins of Project 10 and School-based Intervention, 1991 
JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 9, 13 (1992); Laura Reiter, Sexual Orientation. Sexual 
Identity. and the Question of Choice, 17 CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK JOURNAL 138 (1989). 
For studies assuming homosexuality is a dysfunction, see, for example, Toward a 
Further Understanding of Homosexuality, COLLECTED PAPERS FROM THE NATIONAL 
AsSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
(1995); CHARLES W. SOCARIDES, M.D., HOMOSEXUALITY: A FREEDOM Too FAR, (1995); 
John K. Milles, The Psychoanalvtic Perspective of Adolescent Homosexuality: A 
Review, XXV ADOLESCENCE 912 (1990). 
118. See, for example, Cleta L. Dempsey, Health and Social Issues of Gay 
Lesbian. and Bisexual Adolescents, 75 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SERVICES 
160 (1994); Charles R. Fikar, Letter to the Editor, 89 PEDIATRICS 519 (1992); Gary 
Remafedi, Fundamental Issues in the Care ofHomosexual Youth, 74 MEDICAL CLINICS 
OF NORTH AMERICA 1169 (1990); Report of the Secretary's Task Force on Youth Suicide. 
Volume 3: Prevention and Interventions in Youth Suicide (Alcohol, Drug Abuse and 
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counselors are unprepared to deal with these exacerbated needs of 
such students, that counseling and assistance can only 
appropriately be done under the direction or control of a licensed 
psychologist to ensure that the experience will not lead to more 
conflict, challenge and confusion. 119 Furthermore, encouraging 
premature resolution120 of confused adolescent gender 
orientation121 toward a self-labeling homosexual status may lead 
to a greater likelihood of attempted suicide122 and could hinder any 
later adult effort to return to or develop hetereosexuality. 123 
How a local school board applies this information when 
confronted with a student application for an extracurricular club 
like the Alliance will to a large degree turn on whether members 
view homosexual conduct as a normal variance in human behavior 
or a dysfunction of biology and socialization. If homosexuality is 
assumed to be an alternate lifestyle, then contributing to the "well-
being" of those students faced with such challenges could include 
support and assistance in making that transition to such a lifestyle 
without regard for state laws or parents prohibiting such conduct 
or the effect a premature decision may have on the adolescent's 
short and long-term physical, emotional and psychological health. 
If homosexuality is assumed to be a dysfunction, then for the sake 
of the student's "well-being" it should not be encouraged by 
allowing open access to unsupervised student promotion of the 
Mental Health Administration), DHHS Pub. No. (ADM) 89-1623, Washington D.C., 
Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1989 ("Report"); Nancy D. Sanford, Providing 
Sensitive Health Care to Gay and Lesbian Youth, 14 NURSE PRACTITIONER 30 (1989); 
John C. Gonsiorek, Mental Health Issues of Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, 1988 
JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 114 (1988); Johnathan Zenilman, Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases in Homosexual Adolescents, 1988 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH CARE 129 (1988). 
119. See for example, Joseph T. Chojnacki and Susan Gelberg, The Facilitation 
of a GavJLesbian/Bisexual Support-Therapy Group by Heterosexual Counselors, 73 
JOURNAL OF COUNSELING AND DEVELOPMENT 352 (1995); Arthur Lipkin, The Case for 
a Gay and Lesbian Curriculum, 77 THE HIGH SCHOOL JOURNAL 95 (1994); Virginia 
Uribe and Karen M. Harbeck, supra, footnote 120; Kevin Cranston, HIV Education 
for Gay. Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth: Personal Risk. Personal Power. and the 
Community of Conscience, 1991 JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 247 (1992); REPORT, 
Vol. IV, Edward A. Wynne, Preventing Youth Suicide Through Education, at 4-171. 
120. John C. Gonsiorek, Mental Health Issues by Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, 
A JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 114, 120 (1988). 
121. Ritch C. Savin-Williams and Richard C. Rodriguez, A Developmental, 
Clinical Perspective on Lesbian, Gay Male, and Bisexual Youth, in ADOLESCENT 
SEXUALITY 77, 81 (Thomas P. Gullota, Gerald R. Adams, Raymond Montemayer eds., 
1995). 
122. G. Remafedi, J.A. Farrow and R.W. Desiher, Risk Factors for Attempted 
Suicide in Gay and Bisexual Youth, 87 PEDIATRICS 869, 873-874 (1991). 
123. JOSEPH NICOLOSI, REPARATIVE THEORY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A CLINICAL 
APPROACH 163 (1991). 
32 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1996 
same; rather, such promotion should be prohibited. 124 Like the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates which illustrated how one's constitutional 
and public policy positions on the expansion of slavery were driven 
by underlying assumptions regarding the nature of man and 
morality, similarly mutually exclusive assumptions regarding the 
nature ofman and morality will likewise direct one's conclusion on 
this issue. 
Yet, whether Utah's criminal law is based on the 
perspective of "millennia of moral teaching,"125 or simply on the 
reality that "[f]rom the beginning of civilized societies, legislators 
and judges have acted on unprovable assumptions,"126 local school 
boards are charged with the duty of implementing law that 
promotes "morality ... and obedience to law" in all of their school 
matters. Being charged with this duty, it surely is not 
unreasonable to follow an alternate view in professional literature 
explaining homosexuality as the result of biological and/or social 
dysfunction, whose physical expression and premature labeling 
should not be encouraged. Assuming this to be so, one cannot 
logically conclude that allowing student-initiated clubs to promote 
homosexuality as an alternate lifestyle will contribute to the "well-
being'' of students. When such a conclusion is based on careful and 
considerate analysis, the decision to reject an application from a 
student club like the Alliance is an option under both state law and 
the EAA regardless of the status of other non-curricular student 
clubs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Neither the EAA nor the Supreme Court interpretation of 
the U.S. Constitution undermines the ability or state-mandated 
duty of local school boards to encourage the teaching by example 
and precept of a morally based, civic virtue in the public schools. 
124. To the degree that other academic literature is correct in identifying peer 
groups as requiring adherence to a fixed perspective on basic issues, if student clubs 
such as the Alliance only intended to include heterosexual friends who supported the 
acceptability of homosexuality as an alternate lifestyle, it is doubtful that a student 
who was confused regarding his or her own sexual identity would receive anything but 
the message of the acceptance of an alternate lifestyle in the Gay-Straight Student 
Alliance. See, for example, W.M. Hall and R.B. Cairns, Aggressive Behavior in 
Children: An Outcome of Modeling or Reciprocity?, 20 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
739-745 (1984); Robert B. Cairns, Holly J. Neckerman, Beverly D. Cairns, Social 
Networks and the Shadows of Synchrony, eds. Gerald R. Adams, Raymond 
Montemayor, Thomas P. Gullota, Biology of Adolescent Behavior and Development 
(1989) at 275. 
125. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
126. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973). 
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Neither student speech, academic freedom, nor private conduct of 
teachers that has a nexus on their ability to teach and role model 
identified virtues to their students limit a school board's ability to 
fulfill its legislative mandate to do so. There are different legal 
perspectives regarding whether or not the effect of the EAA is to 
prohibit full enforcement of Utah laws protecting freedom of 
conscience, parental autonomy and family privacy when applied to 
extra-curricular student clubs. 
Nonetheless, a local school board could adopt the position 
supported by academic literature and long standing experience, 
that short and long-term adherence to the criminal code of the 
state will promote the well-being of its students, and that 
individual students experiencing extraordinary challenges with 
gender identity should work with qualified professionals (that are 
generally not within the school system). Then it would be possible 
to deny recognition under the EAA to a proposed student club that 
focuses on homosexuality, without having to ban all other non-
curricular student clubs presently allowed. 
